### University of Luxembourg

Multilingual. Personalised. Connected.

WE NEE

# Reputation-based Byzantine Consensus

Jeremie Decouchant, Joint work with Jiangshan Yu, David Kozhaya, Paulo Esteves-Veríssimo CritiX, SnT jeremie.decouchant@uni.lu



### RepuCoin: addressing the 51% attack





### RepuCoin: addressing the 51% attack

**51% ATTACK BITCOINS BIGGEST THREAT** 

### RepuCoin: Your Reputation is Your Power

IEEE Transactions on Computers 2019

Jiangshan Yu \*, David Kozhaya', Jeremie Decouchant\*, and Paulo Esteves-Verissine <sup>†</sup> ABB Corporate Research, Switzerland,

not tolerate attackers controlling more than 50% of the art---Existing proof-of-work (PoW) crypts time, but assume that such nlikely". However, recent attack where attackers can rent mining capacity

s RepuCoin, the first system to provide n more than 50% of the system's computdominated by an attacker, RepuCoin rate of voting power growth of the entire or rate or vision defines a miner's power by its fact, RepuCoin defines a miner's power by its inction integrated over the entire blockchain. gh its sheer computing power which can be vely quickly and temporarily. As an example, operation, RepuCoin can tolerate attacks 5176 or the network's computing resources, even r stays maliciously seized for almost a whole stays manusumaty searce for annuos a wrone RepaCoin provides better resilience to known of nepat.ann provides better resinence to known ared to existing PoW systems, while achieving a upput of 10000 transactions per second (TPS).

Bitcoin [47] is the most successful decentralized cryp-Bacoin [47] is the most successful decentralized cryp-mers' to date. It has deprechangle from almost no value from the second second from almost no value for use of the second region second region second in promising examing sommons 159, 32, 11 and the low throughput problem of Bircoin. tation of the second second second real second real second strong consistency but suffer from liveness animency can same from inveness an attacker has a relatively small Moreover, the resilience of such

155), summerers, the remember of south attacks, such as selfish mining attacks r has more than 25% of the computing 1, 20, 55, 49], remains unsatisfactory. In addition, all v), remains unsansiaciney, in assume, an ary proof-of-work (PoW) based variant ndemporary proof-of-work (PoW) based variants a (e.g. [2, 5], 2], 3]) rely on the accomption tacker cannot have more than 35% or 80% of power at any time. However, with the cophi-tatacks mounted on Biacein, e.g., flash attacks ( Bitc that an attacker of

(a.k.a. bribery attacks), where an attacker can obtain a temporary majority (>50%) of computing power by remin-ming capacity (12) all these systems would be a chaing wohnions that address the weaknesses associated existing wohnions that address the weaknesses associated exists and exists a

with Bitcoin still suffer from significant she the paper addresses these shortcomings This paper addresses these shortcomings — inverses ourent high-throughput solutions, and vulnerability in tacks such as selfab mining and fash attacks. In particu-rent more Reserving the first extense that one new ucas such as settion imming and itasn anacks. In particular, we propose RepaCoin, the first system that can prevent stacks against an attacker who may possess more than one attacks against an attacker who may possess more than 50% computing power of the entire network temporarily (e.g., a few weeks or even months). Our proof-of-concept (e.g., a few weeks or even months). Our prostor-concept implementation shows that while providing better security guarantees than predecessor protocols. RepuCoin also enguarantees than predecessor protocols. RepuCoin also en-sures a very high throughput (10000 transactions pre-sec-ond). In practice, Visa confirms a transaction within second-ter and the second second second second second second second transaction and transaction within second se

ond). In practice, Visa confirms a transaction within seconds, and processes 1.7k TPS on average [59], This shows that RepuCoin satisfies the required throughput of real world Design principle. Our system addresses

Design principle, this system addition principle, called trong challenges by defining a new design principle, called print of reputation. Proof-of-reputation is based on proof. proof-or-reputation, every-or-reprinting to of-work, but with two fundamental improv-First, and wan new nanamental improvements. First, under proof-of-reputation a miner's decision power

nni In UNIVERSITÉ DU

CRITIX


the voting power for reaching convenues in the sys-ine voting power for reaching convenues in the sys-is given by its reputation. A namer's reputation is non) is given by its reputation. A numer's reputation not measured by what we call the miner's 'instance, and the miner's 'instan not measured by white we can use numer x monancesas power, i.e., the miner's computing power in a short time range, as in classic POM, Instead, the reputation is computed based on both the totel amount of vulid work a miner base based on both the total amount of vature work a mome nan-contributed to the system and the regularity of that work over the entire period of time during which the system has over the entire period of time during which the system has been active. We call this the minet's 'integrated power'. So, when an attacker joins the system at time t, even if it has a when an anacker joins the system at time r, even if it has a very strong mining ability that is, high computational (i.e. instantaneous) power, it would have no integrated power at time t, or even shortly after, as it did not contri

Second, when a miner deviates from the syste Second, when a miner deviates from the system specifi-cations, RepuCoin lowers the miner's reputation, and hence its integrated power, in consequence of this negative con-Its integrated power, in consequence of this negative con-trabution. This prevents a powerful multicoas mister from stacking the system repeatedly without significant on and quences. In contrast, classic PoW systems either do and superst and foreards for multicher ensistence outsets due and aduly-bequences. In contrast, classic row systems either do not support any feature for panishing miners that do not abide by system specifications, or they paraits these miners by merely revoking their rewards — this does not prevent them from

### RepuCoin – Intuition



- Miners gain reputation by contributing to the blockchain
- 2. Only top reputed miners can vote through a BFT protocol (e.g., PBFT)
- 3. Mis-behaved miners will be punished, and they lose reputation
- Leaders are randomly selected from top reputed miners to propose transactions



### RepuCoin – Increased attack resilience

securityandtrust.lu

• For an adversary to build enough reputation takes time

Joining time\ Target	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
1 month	infeasible	45%	30%	27%
3 months	infeasible	90%	45%	33%
6 months	infeasible	infeasible	68%	45%
9 months	infeasible	infeasible	90%	54%
12 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	68%
18 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	91%
20 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible

### RepuCoin – Increased attack resilience

securityandtrust.lu

• For an adversary to build enough reputation takes time

Joining time\ Target	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
1 month	infeasible	45%	30%	27%
3 months	infeasible	90%	45%	33%
6 months	infeasible	infeasible	68%	45%
9 months	infeasible	infeasible	90%	54%
12 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	68%
18 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	91%
20 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible


Breaking the liveness property:

## Implementation: BFT-SMaRt (Java)

### https://github.com/bft-smart/library


### A block was discovered in the network

The block is added to the blockchain



UNIVERSITÉ DI

CRITIX



## Implementation: BFT-SMaRt (Java)

### https://github.com/bft-smart/library



CRITIX

### Performance evaluation



### Measure


- Latency
- Throughput

Depending on

- Consensus group size
- Block size

Settings (in the code)

- Limit bandwidth
- Impose network latency



### HPC workflow



- 1. Find a set of machines on a single cluster
- 2. Create an interactive job and connect to it

\$ oarsub –I –l nodes=13,walltime=1:0:0 \$ oarsub –C 12345

- 3. Edit BFT-SMaRt's config files (machines to use and port) \$ cat \$OAR\_NODEFILE
- 4. Bash: script to run the throughput/latency benchmark
  - Kill any java application on the machines
  - Launch replicas
  - Launch clients

\$ oarsh -f \${ip\_addr} "cd bftsmart.repucoin; ./runscript > /dev/null 2>&1 &" &

5. Python: collect the results (output file) and plot

### **Best practices**

Securityandtrust.lu UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG

- Search for the right code basis
  - Your life will be much easier
- Automate everything
  - You always think you won't need to repeat the experiments: wrong!
  - The initial additional work is quickly amortized
- Latency vs. throughput experiments are tricky
  - The throughput should increase with the load up to a certain point, where the latency starts increasing
  - But too many requests make the applications crash (message queues)
  - Find the right number of clients

### Lessons learned

- Estimate the time it takes for your experiment and double it
  - Plan ahead
- It is difficult to be on a completely controlled environment
  - Change the machines  $\rightarrow$  Change your performance
  - Are there a lot of jobs ongoing?
- Performance is sometimes difficult to understand
  - Example: The performance with 8MB blocks is lower than with 4MB
  - I spent a day repeating the experiments and got the same result: I still don't explain it

